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Abstract
We investigate the effects of monetary policy on the financing policies of firms through the
expected market interest rate channel at the firm level with Japanese syndicated loan contracts
from 2000 to 2016, when monetary policy in Japan was almost stuck at the zero bound and the
Bank of Japan introduced various unconventional monetary policy measures. To identify the
interest rate channels of this monetary policy, we control for both observed and unobserved
firm heterogeneity and unobserved time-varying bank heterogeneity in loan contracts. The
evidence presented here demonstrates that both pricing (loan spread) and non-pricing (loan
maturity) terms of loan contracts are affected by monetary policy shocks. In particular, mon-
etary policy shocks have heterogeneous effects on loan maturity. The response to a monetary
policy shock associated with a decrease in long-term interest rates is significant only for the
borrower group with access to bonds, that is, less financially constrained firms.
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1 Introduction
The credit supply conditions for Japanese firms have changed drastically since 2000 when the
Bank of Japan (BOJ) made changes in its operating procedures and communications strategies.
Japanese firms experienced a lifting of the zero interest rate policy in 2000, the introduction of a
quantitative easing policy in 2001, the turmoil of the global financial crisis, and loose monetary
conditions under low interest rates. Although the BOJ introduced various unconventional monetary
policy measures, including forward rate guidance and asset purchasing programs, on the borrower’s
side, many firms still accumulated cash after the global financial crisis. Against this background,
the effects of monetary policy on firms’ demand for credit became blurred. Key questions include
whether and how interest rates at historically low levels under the unconventional monetary policy
affected the financing policies of firms. That is, is an interest rate channel operational at the firm
level?
The effects of monetary policy on the lending behavior of banks have been extensively studied
using macro-level data such as Bernanke & Blinder (1992), bank-level data such as Kashyap &
Stein (2000), and loan level data such as Khwaja & Mian (2008), among others. In order to
disentangle the supply from the demand for loans, Jime´nez et al. (2012) and Jime´nez et al. (2014)
analyzed the effects of monetary policy on credit supply by controlling time-varying observed and
unobserved firm and bank heterogeneity with loan application records. In particular, Jime´nez et al.
(2014) demonstrated that a lower overnight interest rate induces banks to engage in higher risk-
taking in their lending through loan applications and contracts. While these earlier papers provide
decisive approaches and evidence for the effects of monetary policy on the supply of credit, this
paper is the first to empirically identify the impacts of monetary policy on the financing policies of
firms through the expected market interest rate channel.
Using tranche-level domestic syndicated loan contracts from 2000 to 2016, we identified the
financing policies of firms and broke down the loan contracts into pricing (loan spread) and non-
pricing (loan maturity) terms. The demand for syndicated loans is rooted in corporate activity,
which enables us to isolate the firm’s demand for loans. However, the identification challenges for
testing the expected market interest rate channel remain. As a loan contract is a mutual agreement
between a borrower and a lender, the terms of the contract reflect both demand-side and supply-
side factors. To test the expected market interest rate channel, we controlled the firm’s unobserved
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heterogeneity with the borrower fixed effects, which could have stemmed from the firm balance-
sheet channel of monetary policy at the firm level. In addition, industry-by-year fixed effects are
included to control the relevant business cycle variation. More importantly, for arranger banks,
which will be referred to simply as banks in this paper, unobserved and time-varying heterogene-
ity is controlled through bank-by-year fixed effects, which could have stemmed from the bank
balance-sheet channel of the monetary policy.
Our estimation strategy begins with baseline models to explain loan spread and loan maturity
of the loan contracts. As both terms (loan spread and maturity) are important for exerting practical
influence on firms’ decisions on investment and investment activities, a large body of the litera-
ture explores the factors influencing them and explains the borrower’s choice by focusing on, for
example, agency costs (in Myers (1977) and Barnea et al. (1980)), asymmetric information (in
Flannery (1986), Diamond (1991), and Guedes & Opler (1996)), the cyclical nature of debt and
debt maturity (in Emery (2001) and Becker & Ivashina (2014)), supply-side factors (in Custo´dio
et al. (2013)), taxes (in Brick & Ravid (1985) and Fan et al. (2012)), and other market friction.
From these findings from the literature, we explored the determinants of loan spread and maturity
from our baseline results. Furthermore, we controlled the observed and unobserved characteristics
of the borrower and its relevant business cycle variation with borrower fixed effects and industry-
by-year fixed effects stemming from the borrower (firm) balance-sheet channel of monetary policy
for the following tests. Then, we added variables relating to macroeconomic and credit supply
conditions with bank-by-year fixed effects to fulfill the specifications, which controlled for the
bank’s unobserved and time-varying heterogeneity stemming from the bank balance-sheet channel
of monetary policy.
Another identification challenge in this study is how to measure the monetary policy stance
in Japan during our sample period. Since the 1990s, the Japanese short-term interest rates have
remained very low, or even zero, and the BOJ introduced various unprecedented monetary policies
such as zero interest rates, forward guidance, quantitative easing (QE), quantitative and qualitative
monetary easing (QQE), and negative interest rates. In an extremely low interest rate environment,
the short-term policy rate is not an appropriate measure for the monetary policy stance. This
difficulty is well recognized among researchers, and a growing body of the literature has proposed
a method to identify monetary policy shocks and to measure the effects of monetary policy shocks;
for example, measuring monetary policy surprises through movements in asset prices in Gu¨rkaynak
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et al. (2005b) and Gertler & Karadi (2015), and applying a method of principal components to
data on assets prices in Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005a), Wright (2012), and Rogers et al. (2014). We
applied this standard method of principal components to identify monetary policy shocks and the
responses of asset prices to monetary policy announcements, and then examined their effects on
loan contracts. Despite these difficulties, with strong bank-firm relationships, a long period of very
low interest rates, and the BOJ’s various unconventional monetary policy measures, Japan provides
a unique and useful setting for testing the effect of monetary policy shocks on the financing policies
of firms.
We observed that monetary policy shocks associated with increases in short-horizon swap rates
and risky asset prices induce higher loan spreads. We refer to this policy shock as the expansionary
twist shock. This monetary policy shock leads to a higher loan spread through the expected market
interest rate channel, which is due mainly to the reaction of short-horizon rates. The expansionary
twist shock also exerts influence on the maturity of loan contracts as it induces the borrower to
shorten the maturity in loan contracts when it is associated with a decrease in long-term interest
rates. Our estimation results confirmed the survey results in Graham & Harvey (2001), that is,
corporate executives attempt to time their interest rates and borrow short-term credit when they
expect the long-term rates to decline.
Given the fact that borrowers face different financial constraints, we examined whether the bor-
rowers’ responses to monetary policy shocks are uniform by dividing our sample into borrowers
with access and borrowers without access to the public corporate bond market. While estimation
results provide weak evidence in the loan spread models, the expansionary twist shock has sig-
nificant and negative effects only on firms with access to bonds in loan maturity models. Thus,
borrowers with access to bonds are more likely to time the market by borrowing short-term credit
when they expect the long-term rates to decline. As borrowers with access and without access
to bonds face different financial constraints, the estimation results suggest differential effects of
monetary policy shocks across borrowers with different credit quality through the expected market
interest rate channel. The estimates demonstrate that our major contribution to the literature is the
identification of the expected market interest rate channel in the financing policies of firms, under
the unconventional monetary policy regime, and this effect depends on the borrowers’ financial
constraints.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the institutional back-
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ground and discusses the trends in Japanese syndicated loans. Section 3 describes our data and
estimation strategy. Section 4 provides our baseline results. We identify the unconventional mone-
tary policy shocks and the results of the monetary policy shock effects in Section 5, while the final
section offers some concluding remarks.
2 Institutional Background and Trends
The Japanese economy is characterized by a corporate loan market based on tight banking
relationships. Bank loans have been the main source of funds for Japanese firms, especially until
the 1980s. In the 1990s, some listed firms obtained better access to other credit markets such as the
bond market, but bank loans continued to be the main funding source for small- and medium-sized
firms. Moreover, the close relationship between borrowing firms and lending banks —the so-
called main bank system—has played an important role in the performance of firms. This structure
can typically be compared to the market-centered credit market system in the United States (for
example, see Peek & Rosengren (2005) and Hoshi & Kashyap (2001)). In this tight relationship,
Japanese firms raise funds mostly through bank loans from individual lenders with whom they
once transacted. In particular, the Japanese main bank system of long-term relationships between
banks and firms (lenders and borrowers) is considered to have fostered Japanese post-war (WWII)
economic development from the 1950s to the mid-1970s, when firms needed external finance (Aoki
et al. (1994)). The key economic role of the main bank system in Japan has been broadly discussed
in the literature by (Aoki et al., 1994; Weinstein & Yafeh, 1998; Hoshi & Kashyap, 2001; Shin &
Kolari, 2004), among others.
Although banking relationships have helped in the rapid growth of the post-war Japanese econ-
omy, focusing on the nexus between problems in the banking sector and low productivity growth
demonstrates that this was one of the reasons for the prolonged low economic growth periods of
the 1990s after the collapse of the bubble economy.1 The deterioration in the financial conditions of
Japanese banks led to the syndicated loan market becoming another source of funds for firms that
wanted to shift their funding sources from bilateral lending, which excessively relied on the main
bank system. Furthermore, the banks that were under pressure to shrink their risk assets, especially
1See Hoshi & Kashyap (2004) for a discussion about economic stagnation and Japan’s financial crisis. Peek &
Rosengren (2005) also demonstrate the misallocation of credit by troubled Japanese banks, who had an incentive to
allocate more credit to severely impaired borrowers to avoid the realization of losses on their own balance sheets.
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after the 1997-1998 Japanese financial crisis, wanted to spread their risk exposure between groups
of lenders. In this financial crisis period, some smaller regional financial institutions found it dif-
ficult to manage their funds. Against this backdrop, the syndicated loan market captured firms’
demand for loans, as it allowed them to draw funds when needed. For banks, the syndicated loan
system appeared to be an attractive profit source, because it provided the lenders with additional
returns such as arranger, agent, commitment, and facility fees. One reason why the syndicated
loan market could not develop in Japan until then, was the legal concern that the commitment and
facility fees could be considered deemed interest under the Rate Restriction Act (Act No. 100 of
1954) and the Act Regulating the Receipt of Contributions, the Receipt of Deposits, and Interest
Rates (Act No. 195 of 1954). That is, when the actual lending amount is small, the amounts paid
to the lender can exceed the legal interest ceiling as specified in the above Acts even if the amounts
consisted of only a facility fee. However, the Act on Specified Commitment Line Contract (Act
No. 4 of 1999) was enacted in 1999, establishing the legal foundation for the commitment line
(revolving facility)-type syndicated loan contracts. Commitment fees and facility fees are not re-
garded as deemed interest to the extent prescribed by this Act; see Hirano (2007) and Sugahara
et al. (2007) for the details.
Figure 1 illustrates the trends of syndicated loans, the total new loan volumes, and the number
of syndicated loan deals issued each year in Japan from 2000 to 2016. While the borrowing data
from the BOJ, the Total/New Loans for Fixed Investment, do not indicate notable growth in total
new loan volume since 2000, the syndicated loan market has grown significantly.2
[Figure 1 around here]
An interesting feature is observed in the syndicated loan market trends during the 2007-2008 global
financial crisis period (the subprime mortgage crisis and the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy). Other
major markets around the world contracted during this period. For example, compared to the previ-
ous year, in 2008, syndicated lending declined by 50.2% in America, by 48.5% in EMEA (Europe,
the Middle East, and Africa), and by 9.5% in Asia, excluding Japan and Australia, according to
Thomson Reuters. On the other hand, the Japanese syndicated loan market grew by 35.8% in 2008
over the previous year, and this was the only major market that grew in 2008. One reason for this
2Although the coverage of the lender to which the Act on Specified Commitment Line Contract (Act No. 4 of
1999) is applicable does not exactly match the coverage in the statistics of the Total/New Loans for Fixed Investment
from the BOJ website, this is the only available data on the yearly total new loan volume in Japan.
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growth is that the impact of the global financial crisis on Japanese financial institutions was not as
severe as that on U.S. and European financial institutions. Another is that Japanese firms refinanced
their borrowing in anticipation of worsening market conditions in the near future. Moreover, they
used the syndicated loan system as an alternative to corporate bonds during the crisis. This implies
that syndicated lending not only allows a borrowing firm to avail a loan that could be too large for
a single bank, but also serves as an important source of external finance amid the turmoil of the
corporate bond market.
As for the composition of investors in the syndicated loan market, the Japanese syndicated
market is almost dominated by banks, whereas in the United States, various types of institutional
investors, such as commercial and investment banks, hedge funds, and private equity funds, play
a major role. In addition, the wave of mergers of large banks in the early 2000s dramatically
reduced the number of large banks in Japan. Since the 1980s, twenty large Japanese banks have
merged to form three “megabank” groups (Mitsubishi UFJ, Mizuho, and Sumitomo Mitsui). In
order to grasp the concentration of lead arrangers in the Japanese syndicated loan market, we
calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of lead arrangers for Japanese syndicated loans
using the syndicated loan data from the Thomson One database.3 Figure 2 illustrates the market
concentration measures (CR4 and HHI) for Japanese lead arrangers from 2000 to 2016.
[Figure 2 around here]
One reason why the market concentration measures for lead arrangers in Japan have not declined
over the past decade appears to be the wave of mergers.4 From CR4 in Figure 2, the mergers and
acquisitions (M&A) of megabanks have kept the shares high since the latter half of the 2000s.
3The HHI for syndicated loan lead arrangers is calculated as HHIt =
∑N
i=1
(
100si,t
St
)2
, where si,t is the sum of
deal proceeds—here, financial institution i is the lead arranger in year t—St(=
∑N
i=1 si,t) is the industry total (total
amount of syndicated loans) in year t, and N is the number of lead arrangers who had at least one deal in year t.
Due to the many mergers of financial institutions, we recode the proceeds by each lead arranger when the financial
institutions merge to form a new financial institution in mid-year. In order to avoid double counting of the number of
lead arrangers in year t, we aggregate the proceeds by each merged financial institution to the newly formed financial
institution at the end of year t. If arrangers 1 and 2 merge to form arranger 3 in year t, we recode the proceeds arranged
by arrangers 1 and 2 as proceeds arranged by arranger 3 in year t.
4Mizuho Holdings, Inc, one of the current three megabank groups, was established by the merger of Dai-Ichi
Kangyo Bank (DKB), Fuji Bank (Fuji), and the Industrial Bank of Japan (IBJ) in September 2000, when all shares of
the DKB, Fuji, and IBJ were acquired by the newly formed Mizuho Holdings. After this, a series of mergers in the
early 2000s led to the formation of Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group in October 2005. The other megabank, Sumitomo
Mitsui Banking Corporation, was formed by the merger of the Sumitomo Bank and Sakura Bank in April 2001.
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Another probable reason is that the leveraged loan market size in Japan shrank during the
global financial crisis period and the recovery that followed was not sufficient to attract various
institutional investors, because they continued to face many obstacles such as insufficient infor-
mation revelation and secondary market problems.5 The reasons for this high concentration also
include the fact that many foreign financial institutions such as Citi, Credit Agricole CIB, BNP
Paribas SA, Deutsche Bank, and JP Morgan decreased their arranged loan proceeds as Japanese
banks increased their proceeds.6 The market share of foreign lead arrangers was higher in the early
2000s, but it declined in the late 2000s, partly due to the global financial crisis. Some borrowers are
believed to have switched their lead arrangers back to their main banks after the global financial
crisis. However, the reason for the decline in the foreign bank market share is not straightfor-
ward because the large Japanese banks were experienced enough to facilitate and lead a group of
financial institutions at that time.
The three megabank groups maintain a high market share in the lead arranger market. However,
this does not necessarily mean that the environment surrounding the syndicated loan market is
favorable for megabanks. Since the BOJ announced an asset-purchasing program in October 2010,
the long-term interest rate has been trending downward. In addition, the BOJ initiated a QQE
policy in April 2013, and then finally introduced a negative interest rate policy. The unprecedented
monetary easing operation continues for an extended period, thus making it difficult for financial
institutions to generate high returns.
These stylized facts about the patterns and trends of Japanese syndicated loans suggest that
the design of the syndicated loan contract, including the pricing and non-pricing terms, might be
influenced by the borrower’s financial conditions, and by supply-side factors. In addition, the
impacts of unconventional monetary policies on financial institutions and borrowing firms should
be considered. We will carefully investigate these relationships in the following sections.
5In the United States, non-bank institutional investors are active players in the leveraged loan market. See Lim
et al. (2014) for the loan market segment and non-bank institutional investors’ participation.
6Citi is said to have launched the first commitment line type loan in March 1998 by claiming outright that commit-
ment fees are not deemed interest even before the enactment of the Act on Specified Commitment Line Contract in
1999. See Sugahara et al. (2007).
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3 The Data and the Estimation Strategy
We used a panel dataset to investigate the syndicated loan contracts and responses to monetary
policy shocks empirically. For this analysis, we combined several different data sources. The
data on tranche-level syndicated loan contracts were retrieved from the Thomson Reuter LPC
DealScan. We retrieved the tranche-level loan data from January 1, 2000, to December 31, 2016,
and the borrower country was Japan, and the tranche currency was JPY. We retrieved details on
all completed deals, excluding bilateral deals. DealScan data are extensively used, in particular,
for research in the United States and Europe. Previous papers on syndicated loans already provide
details of DealScan data (for e.g., see Ivashina (2009) and Lim et al. (2014)). While the data
on loan contracts such as borrower name, maturity, arranger and lender information, syndication
information, tranche amount, tranche type, seniority type, and spread are taken from DealScan, the
borrower firm’s name is listed in English without providing the Securities Identification Code in
Japanese. In order to identify the borrowers with their Japanese corporate names and to supplement
the missing data, we utilized the loan deal data taken from the Thomson Reuters’ Thomson One
database, which provided information in Japanese.
The data on borrower’s credit ratings and seven financial indicators—volatility (daily volatility
over the last 30 days based on closing stock prices), ROE, long-term debt to equity, total debt to
EBITDA, sales growth (YoY), EBITDA growth (YoY), and total assets—in the accounting year
(for stock prices, trading day) immediately prior to each loan origination were drawn from the
Thomson Reuters Eikon. We took the credit rating information, when available, from the DealScan
database, and otherwise used the rating information from the Thomson Reuters Eikon. Credit
rating information was derived from R&I, JCR, S&P, and Moody’s. In order to maximize the
sample size, we used the lowest available ratings provided by these four rating institutions. We
combined the detailed data on individual syndicated loan contracts with the borrower’s financial
indicators and credit rating information.
For the pricing term of the syndicated loan contract, our base model for the loan spread on
individual loan tranches takes the following form:
Spreadi,j,l,t = αj + αl,t + β1Controlsi,j,l,t + ui,j,l,t (1)
The dependent variable, Spreadi,j,l,t, is the all-in-drawn spread, that is, the spread of the loan
tranche i over the Tokyo Interbank Offered Rate (TIBOR) at time t in basis points, plus any annual
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fees that the borrower j in industry l must pay the lender. We used the all-in-drawn spread because
of data availability and following previous studies such as Lim et al. (2014). Borrower fixed effects,
represented by αj , absorb the unobserved borrower heterogeneity, which could have stemmed from
the firm balance-sheet channel of monetary policy at the firm level. Two-digit NAICS industry-by-
year fixed effects, represented by αl,t, are included to control the relevant business cycle variation.
The vector of variables, Controls, contains the following sets of variables: (i) the borrower’s
credit rating variables; (ii) the borrower’s financial indicators; and (iii) the tranche characteristics.
(i) The borrower’s credit rating variables are 0-1 dummy variables. For example, AA rating takes
the value of unity if the borrower’s rating is AA+, AA, or AA- and zero otherwise, when the base
rating is below a BB rating. Credit rating is the observable indicator of the firm’s credit risk, and
firms with higher credit rating have lower probabilities of defaulting on debts. Compared with
a base rating, an AA rating (A, BBB, and BB ratings) indicates an improvement in the firm’s
financial conditions and is expected to lead to a decrease in loan spread.
For (ii) the borrower’s financial indicators, a vector of variables capturing the firm’s financial
characteristics is included.7 Firms with the same rating may have different risks and probabilities
of default. Seven variables are included in this vector: Volatility, ROE, Long-term debt to equity,
Total debt to EBITDA, Sales growth, EBITDA growth, and ln(Total assets). Volatility, measured as
the daily volatility over the last 30 days using the daily closing stock prices, is included to gauge
the degree of uncertainty perceived by market participants in the firm’s business. An increase in
Volatility is expected to lead to an increase in spread. ROE is defined as the net income returned as
a percentage of shareholder equity and indicates the borrower’s profitability. Higher profitability is
expected to decrease the loan spread. Two of the variables included in this vector, Long-term debt
to equity and Total debt to EBITDA, are measures of debt ratio to gauge financial flexibility. As
these ratios increase, the risks that the firm could face associated with financial hardships grow. We
also include in this vector two measures of firm growth: Sales growth, used as a proxy for business
expansion, and EBITDA growth, used as a metric of change in profitability. The total amount of
assets is used to measure firm size as the logarithm of the firm’s total real assets ln(Total assets).
For (iii) tranche characteristics, a vector of variables related to the individual loan tranche
characteristics reflects the different risks that creditors bear. Tenor measured in years refers to the
7A correlation matrix for a set of financial indicators was computed to determine whether there is a multicollinearity
problem when they are put into the regression model together. As no highly correlated variables can be found among
the financial indicators, we used all the variables in the regression model at the same time.
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amount of time left for the repayment of a loan. The risk associated with a given loan contract is
higher for a long tenor, holding other factors constant, and we expect a higher spread to compensate
for this greater risk in the form of a premium. Secured takes the value of unity when the loan
facility is secured, and it is expected to capture the effect of protecting the lender in case of a
borrower’s default. Tranche type is a set of 0-1 dummy variables for various types of tranche such
as bridge loans, term loans, revolver lines, 364-day facility, and so on. A set of Lender country
dummy variables controls the lender operating country. A variable No. of Lenders controls for the
syndication size.
For the non-pricing term of a syndicated loan contract, the base model for maturity on the
individual loan tranche Maturityi,j,l,t, which refers to the length of time left to the maturity date
(in months), is formed as follows:
Maturityi,j,l,t = αj + αl,t + β2Controlsi,j,l,t + υi,j,l,t (2)
where borrower fixed effects, represented by αj , and two-digit NAICS industry-by-year fixed ef-
fects, represented by αl,t are contained to absorb the unobserved borrower heterogeneity, which
could have stemmed from the firm balance-sheet channel of monetary policy at the firm level, and
to control the relevant business cycle variation, respectively. A set of explanatory variables is al-
most the same as the loan spread model, although a dummy variable Subordinated is included in
Controls instead of a dummy variable Secured due to the collinearity when using a sample for the
maturity model. Subordinated is a 0-1 dummy variable taking the value of unity when the seniority
type is subordinated.
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the estimation and indicates a
gap in the number of observations between the loan spreads and maturity. One main reason for this
gap is that, in Japan, the disclosure of spread and fees is on a voluntary basis, and hence the avail-
able observations for loan maturity are much larger. Another reason is that different benchmark
interest rates are used and reported to calculate the spreads such as LIBOR, TIBOR, Yen LIBOR,
and prime rate. From the reported loan spread benchmarks, we use TIBOR as the benchmark in-
terest rate to cover the largest number of observations in the loan spread model. The distribution of
credit rating dummy variables and the Tenor (in years) variable is presented in Table 1 to assuage
concerns that the properties of the samples in the analysis might differ between the loan spread
and loan maturity models. The ratio of borrowers with an A rating is slightly higher in the loan
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spread model, but no large gap is observed. In addition, as Tenor (in years), which corresponds to
Maturity (in months) in the loan maturity model, has the same quantiles and mean value, no major
difference between the samples was detected.
[Table 1 around here]
The Controls vector includes credit rating dummy variables for the AAA, AA, A, BBB, and BB
rating groups. Previous studies have demonstrated that low-risk firms could prefer short-term
borrowing to lower their borrowing costs because they are more likely to report good quarterly
earnings in the near future than higher-risk firms. On the other hand, lenders are not willing to
provide long-term credit to firms with very high risk.
Regarding the borrower’s financial indicators, the expected coefficients on profitability mea-
sures ROE and EBITDA growth are negative. As these firms are expected to illustrate hopeful
prospects when their sales figures are announced in the near future, they prefer to borrow short-
term debt to lower their borrowing costs. Borrowers with higher Long-term debt to equity and
Total debt to EBITDA ratios are expected to choose long-term borrowing to avoid liquidity risks
by locking in long-term debt because borrowers with less financial flexibility can incur a liquidity
risk if they refinance inopportunely. Previous studies have demonstrated that liquidity risk plays
an important role in a firm’s decisions, particularly with regard to debt maturity, because even
low-risk borrowers can temporarily experience a loss in profits and refinance their debt inoppor-
tunely during economic downturns. Subsequently, firms attempt to avoid higher interest costs in
bad times, or in a worse scenario, they are forced to shrink or forgo their business investments.
Another theoretical implication provided by Fukuda et al. (1998) is the preference for long-term
debt, even by low-risk borrowers, when faced with a liquidity risk; they tested this empirically
using Japanese data from 1970 to 1996. Their results for the sample after 1980 strongly support
their theoretical implication. We also expect positive coefficients on these variables. Variables as-
sociated with business size, Sales growth, and ln(Total assets) are expected to indicate the possible
need for long-term debt to avoid the liquidation risk of losing their business.
As a tranche characteristic, we expect a positive coefficient on the variable Subordinated be-
cause a long-term subordinated loan is likely to be recognized as equity credit attributes by rating
agencies. Some borrowers procure funds through subordinated syndicated loans that have equity
credit attributes so that they can improve their financial ratios by capital reinforcement without
diluting their shares.
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4 Baseline Results
In this section, we begin with the baseline results for the pricing term, which indicates the loan
spread, and the non-pricing term, which indicates the maturity, in loan contracts. We then saturate
our baseline specifications with bank-by-year fixed effects to control time-varying and unobserved
bank heterogeneity, which could have stemmed from the bank balance-sheet channel of monetary
policy, and variables relating to macroeconomic and credit supply conditions to absorb the cyclical
properties of loan contracts.
4.1 Spreads
Table 2 illustrates the baseline results of the borrower fixed-effects and industry-by-year fixed
effects for loan spreads. The estimates using the borrower’s credit ratings in columns (1) and (3)
indicate that less risky firms with higher credit ratings obtain lower loan spreads. The results in
column (3) become slightly stronger by including industry-by-year fixed effects, which control
unobserved and time-varying differences across industries in which the borrower operates as well
as borrower fixed effects.8
[Table 2 around here]
When using the financial indicators of the borrower, risky borrowers with higher volatility
pay a higher loan spread, and borrowers with larger total assets obtain lower loan spreads. In
all specifications (1)–(4), the estimated coefficient on Tenor is significantly positive at the 1%
level with a premium for lengthy maturity. Syndication size, No. of Lenders, seems less likely
to emerge from the pricing term. Given the strength of the bank-firm relationships in Japan, one
might be concerned about the certification effect of the main bank arranger or the endogeneity.
Subsequently, Appendix A tests for the endogeneity ofMain Bank Arranger.
4.2 Maturity
Table 3 reports the baseline results including the borrower fixed-effects and industry-by-year
fixed effects for loan maturity. Columns (1) and (3) use rating information to demonstrate that
8Observations in the specifications with only borrower fixed effects and both borrower fixed effects and industry-
by-year fixed effects differ because we drop singleton groups, which can overstate statistical significance and might
lead to an incorrect inference.
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the relationship between credit risk and maturity seems more complicated than expected. The
theoretical implications demonstrated in previous studies support the negative correlation between
maturity and credit rating; that is, maturity increases as the credit rating worsens, or only very
low-risk and high-risk firms borrow short-term debt. No clear relationship is observed between
credit rating and loan maturity.
[Table 3 around here]
The results of the borrower’s financial indicators in columns (2) and (3) demonstrate that bor-
rowers with higher Sales growth tend to prefer long-term borrowing, which is consistent with the
anticipated relationship that firms with an expanding business attempt to use long-term borrow-
ing to avoid the liquidation risk of losing their business. On the other hand, borrowers with higher
EBITDA growth prefer short-term credit. Previous theoretical studies suggest that firms with grow-
ing profits are more likely to use short-term borrowing because they can lower their borrowing
costs following good news about their profitability after refinancing in the near future, assuming
asymmetric information; that is, the firm is better informed about its own prospects. The negative
estimated coefficient on EBITDA growth supports this theoretical implication.
Estimates in columns (1)–(3) indicate that the number of lenders (or the syndication size) is
associated with short-term borrowing. Longer-term borrowing involves more risk and uncertainty
than shorter-term borrowing, which might be because few lenders are willing to become involved in
syndication for long-term borrowing. The maturity of a subordinated loan would seemmuch longer
than other seniority-type loans, indicating that this type of loan can have equity credit attributes.
4.3 Credit supply conditions and loan contracts
Business cycle risk is an important risk factor for both lenders and borrowers, as the chief
financial officers (CFO) survey evidence in Graham & Harvey (2001) demonstrates. The cyclical
nature of debt and debt maturity is associated with economic activity as investigated by Emery
(2001), Becker & Ivashina (2014) among others. Following previous studies, in order to examine
how borrowers and lenders adjust their debt to economic fluctuations, we add two macroeconomic
control variables relating to macroeconomic growth and credit supply conditions. These control
variables are monthly time-series variables and are not borrower specific.
The first variable is Economic expansion, measured as the Coincident Index (CI) growth rate.
This is an index of Business Conditions, published monthly by the Cabinet Office, Government
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of Japan. The impact of business conditions on the contract is multifaceted. For example, firms
attempt to avoid higher interest costs in bad times, or in a worse scenario, they are forced to shrink
or forgo their business investments. Borrowers are assumed here to take account of the liquidity
risk and time their borrowing, and they are expected to borrow short-term debt in good times when
the probability of the good news about their future prospects is high, and they can refinance at a
lower interest rate. Nonetheless, the economic downturn induces the opposite force, as lenders
are unwilling to lend in the long-term because of the higher probability of risk, and subsequently,
lenders want to provide short-term debts in bad times. For the loan spread, the risk environment
depends on the economic conditions. In good times, on average, the risk is low, and profit is rising.
As this environment leads to lower spreads, a decrease in loan spread is expected.
Another control variable is Lending attitude, to capture the credit supply condition. As the
credit supply condition is more apparent in lending attitudes towards small firms, we use the vari-
able Lending attitude, which is a statistical survey response about the lending attitude of financial
institutions for small enterprises in Tankan (Short-term Economic Survey of Enterprises in Japan),
conducted quarterly by the BOJ. For Lending attitude, small enterprises are asked to choose the
most appropriate answer from three alternatives, (1) Accommodative, (2) Not so severe, and (3)
Severe. The responses are aggregated into a Diffusion Index (percent points) by subtracting the
percentage share of enterprises responding “(3) Severe” from that of enterprises responding “(1)
Accommodative.” We expect negative estimated coefficients on Lending attitude in loan spread
and maturity because the increase in the value of this variable implies an improvement in business
confidence.
Given the important role of arranger banks in a syndicated loan contract, we further absorb
time-varying and unobserved (arranger) bank heterogeneity, which stems from the bank balance-
sheet channels with (arranger) bank-by-year fixed effects. Thus, we adequately isolate the loan
demand factors from loan supply side factors, and this allows us to identify the effects of monetary
policy through the expected market interest rate channel at the firm level in the following section.
4.3.1 Spreads
Table 4 provides the results for the loan spread with these macroeconomic control variables
and bank-by-year fixed effects in addition to borrower fixed effects and two-digit NAICS industry-
by-year fixed effects. Note that the two macroeconomic control variables are far from highly
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correlated. We begin with the borrower fixed effects specifications (1) and (2) to demonstrate that
dropping some firms from the regression sample through the inclusion of many fixed effects is not
the source of the results.
Although the estimated coefficients on Economic expansion are not significant in any specifi-
cation, the estimated coefficients on Lending attitude are as expected and significant in all specifi-
cations. This result indicates that the business confidence is relevant to loan spreads.
Specifications (3) and (4) additionally contain bank-by-year fixed effects and two-digit NAICS
industry-by-year fixed effects. The results in (1)–(4) always suggest that the less risky borrowers
obtain lower loan spreads, but it is more evident in (3) and (4) with bank-by-year fixed effects and
two-digit NAICS industry-by-year fixed effects.
4.3.2 Maturity
In addition to the two macroeconomic control variables, we included the variable Economic
expansion × Total Debt to EBITDA to test the degree of borrower’s financial flexibility over the
business cycle for the loan maturity models. The results in Table 5 demonstrate that the estimated
coefficients on Lending attitude are not significant, suggesting that on average, business confidence
is not relevant to loan maturity. In contrast, they provide weak evidence that Economic expansion
and Economic expansion × Total Debt to EBITDA are associated with long-term borrowing. The
borrowers seem to take advantage of the low-risk environment to lock-in long-term debt and avoid
liquidity risk, and borrowers with higher Total Debt to EBITDA whose increase makes the risk
associated with financial hardships grow, resulting in a lowering of their financial flexibility, take
more advantage of the economic expansion to reduce their liquidity risk.
In the subsequent section, we identify the monetary policy shocks and estimate the effects of
monetary policy shocks on the loan spread and loan maturity with the most saturated specification
in this section.
[Tables 4 and 5 around here]
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5 Identification of UnconventionalMonetary Policy Shocks and
Loan Contracts
During the sample period studied in this analysis, the monetary policy was almost stuck at
the zero bound in Japan. As Wright (2012) notes, the bank rate, the federal fund rate in his paper,
measures the monetary policy stance during normal times when the bank rate is not stuck at the zero
bound (more precisely, in a target range from zero to 25 basis points). However, a single measure of
the overall monetary policy stance cannot be found when the bank rate is close to, or pushed to, the
zero bound, especially through unconventional monetary policy, including forward rate guidance,
asset purchases, and QQE programs. Instead, the idea of measuring monetary policy shocks from
the reaction of the asset prices traded in financial markets has been suggested and employed in the
literature; for example, see Cook & Hahn (1989), Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005b), Wright (2012), and
Rogers et al. (2014). The measurement of monetary policy shocks remains a challenge. Extracting
the first principal component of yields for Treasury futures at different maturities is one method
adopted in previous studies. For Japan, the BOJ adopted various unprecedented monetary policies
since the end of the 1990s, such as a zero interest rate policy, forward guidance, the quantitative
easing policy, and QQE;9. Hence, we attempted to find a way to fit these circumstances in our
sample period. As discussed in detail below, we used various financial asset variables based on the
findings of researchers such as Bernanke & Kuttner (2005), Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005a), and Gertler
& Karadi (2015) to compute the BOJ’s monetary policy shocks.
More concretely, following Cook & Hahn (1989), Wright (2012), Rogers et al. (2014), and
Gertler & Karadi (2015), we assumed that policy shocks reflect the changes in asset prices as mar-
ket participants revise their expectations after policy decisions are announced following monetary
policy meetings. We can consider the revised expectations of financial market participants that are
induced by a central bank’s public statements or policy decisions as monetary policy shocks.
While previous studies have focused on the changes in short-term interest futures, we allowed
for all the surprises reflected in the price changes observed in the various financial markets. This
is partly because the short-term interest rates in Japan hardly changed under the unconventional
monetary policy, and partly because the BOJ introduced different policy measures that directly
affect financial markets other than short-term interest rates.
9see Kuroda (2016) for the details of unconventional monetary policies.
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More precisely, we extracted the common factors in various financial assets through principal
component analysis following Bernanke et al. (2004) and Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005a).10 We extracted
as common factors the policy surprises in the changes in the major financial market variables
following public statements. The principal component analysis of monetary policy on meeting day
t is based on the following equation:
Xt = ΛFt + ϵt, (3)
where Xt = (x1t, .., xnt)′ denotes the vector of n financial variables, ϵt indicates the vector of n
idiosyncratic disturbance terms, Ft is the vector of l unobserved common factors, andΛ is a matrix
of coefficients identified as factor loadings. We extracted the common factors Ft from changes in
11 financial market variables xit (i = 1, .., 11): one futures rate (three-month euro-yen TIBOR
futures), five yen interest swap rates (one, two, five, ten, and thirty years), one short-term spot rate
(three-month euro-yen TIBOR), two spot exchange rates on the Tokyo market (yen-U.S. dollar and
yen-AUS dollar), and two stock indexes (TOPIX and Nikkei JASDAQ).
We calculated the differences in seven interest rate variables, the log differences of exchange
rates, and the stock indexes before and after public statements.11 Note that the stock markets close
at 3:00 p.m. and the BOJ usually holds a press conference at 3:30 p.m., after the monetary policy
meeting, where its governor coveys the background of the policy decisions. Under the unconven-
tional monetary policy regime, where the BOJ introduced various new measures simultaneously,
market participants could not analyze and digest the policy measure effects on financial markets
immediately after the conference. In such a situation, they could not use the BOJ’s explanations at
the press conference and reflect it in their prices.12 Against this background, we used the closing
values on the day before the BOJ’s public statements and on the next day to calculate the changes
in the 11 financial variables. More concretely, for stock prices and exchange rates, xit is defined as
xit = log(Pit+1,close/Pit−1,close)× 100, (4)
10Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005a) point out that the primary alternative to principal components is Kalman filtering, which
is optimal under the assumption of normally distributed residuals, and the normality assumption may not fit their data
very well. This statement also applies to our data.
11To extract the monetary policy shocks, we used the changes in financial market variables on all of the monetary
policy meeting days, except the days mentioned in the footnote 13. For detailed information on the monetary pol-
icy meeting days and policy decisions, see the following BOJ website: https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/
mpmsche_minu/index.htm/
12For a more detailed discussion on the appropriate window for calculating monetary policy surprises, see Neely
(2015), for example.
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and for interest rates, it is defined as
xit = rit+1,close − rit−1,close, (5)
where Pit+1,close and Pit−1,close indicate the closing values of the exchange rates and stock indexes
on the day after a monetary policy meeting and on the previous day, respectively. rit+1,close and
rit−1,close denote the opening and closing interest rates, respectively.
We excluded the meeting dates when the BOJ coordinated policy with the Fed, the European
Central Bank, and the Bank of England as well as the dates when the BOJ changed its policy in
response to the Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11, 2011. The inclusion of these policy
meeting dates could contaminate our monetary policy shocks by reflecting other shocks such as
other central banks’ policy shocks, policy coordination, and disasters.13
To select the number of common factors, we employed the information criteria method pro-
posed by Bai & Ng (2002) and Ahn & Horenstein (2013). These tests suggest that the principal
components from the largest eigenvalues are three, and thus endorse adopting three common fac-
tors as the monetary policy shocks captured by the eleven financial variables. When constructing
the monthly data of policy surprises, we aggregated the two datasets of the three common factors
if the BOJ’s monetary policy meeting is held twice per month.
5.1 The factors of the monetary policy shocks
We extracted three principal components along with the three largest eigenvalues from the
changes in 11 financial asset variables, as illustrated in Figure 3. The first component has slightly
negative loadings on stock price returns and yen exchange rates, suggesting that the positive first
component is associated with the decline in stock prices and appreciation of yen. On the other hand,
the first component has positive loadings on the changes in interest rates. The size of loadings for
swap rates is almost the same across the different interest rate swap time horizons, suggesting that
the first component captures a parallel shift of the yield curve. From the viewpoint of monetary
policy implementation and the market participants’ response, the first component reflects an unan-
ticipated increase in the policy rate, shifting the entire path of the future policy rate while slightly
decreasing stock prices. We call the first component target interest rate shock. In fact, in Appendix
13The following meeting dates are excluded: September 18 and 29, 2008; November 30, 2011 (BOJ meetings to
coordinate policy); and March 14, 2011 (the meeting where the BOJ’s response to the Great East Japan Earthquake
was agreed upon).
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B, using a Structural Vector Autoregressive (SVAR) model, we demonstrate that a positive target
interest rate shock increases the interest rates in all maturity levels, thereby shifting up the entire
yield curve.
[Figure 3 around here]
The second component has large positive loadings on stock prices, exchange rates, and swap
rates in the longer horizon, but negative loadings on short-term interest rates. In other words,
a positive second component reflects an unexpected decrease in short-term rates, which leads to
increases in the prices of risky assets. Furthermore, note that a positive shock of the second com-
ponent is associated with decreases in short-term rates and positively associated with an increase
in long-term rates. One of the possible interpretations for this pattern of loadings is that when this
component is positive, market participants expect the interest rate in the longer horizon to increase,
although the BOJ conducts an accommodative monetary policy temporarily. A temporarily accom-
modative policy can be interpreted as a stimulus policy, which leads to an increase in the future
short-term rate. In fact, the development of the second component illustrated in Figure 4 alongside
the evolution of the BOJ’s monetary policy indicates that it peaked when the BOJ introduced a
negative interest rate in January 2016. This component is called steepening curve shock in this
study. In Appendix B, based on the SVAR model, we demonstrate that a positive steepening curve
shock decreases short-term interest rates and increases long-term rates without altering the current
account balances very much.
[Figure 4 around here]
The third component has positive loading on stock returns, swap rates in the short horizon, and
exchange rate returns, but negative loadings on swap rates in the longer horizon. Although the
second and third components have positive loading on stock returns, the third component captures
a different type of monetary policy shock compared to the second one because it has opposite signs
of loadings on swap rates in the short and long horizons. For example, the positive third component
is associated with a decrease in long-term interest rates as well as increases in risky asset prices.
We can interpret that it captures the unconventional policy of lower interest rates in the long-term
horizon and increases in risky asset prices. We refer to the third component as expansionary twist
shock.
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In the analysis of spread models, we used monthly monetary policy shocks, whereas quarterly
monthly policy shocks are used in the maturity models. The contract terms of syndicated loans
are made in the process of negotiation, and the monthly frequency is long enough for the lender
and the borrower to interpret the monetary policy statements and decisions, and to then decide the
pricing term, observing the movement of TIBOR and the demand of investors. Nevertheless, ma-
turity is an important factor affecting various borrowers’ corporate strategies, including financing
and investment. In particular, unconventional monetary policy measures are beyond the conven-
tional interpretation even for managers, and it would take some time for the borrower to interpret
and forecast the interest rate movements for implementing the scheduled investment. We aggre-
gated the monthly policy shock data and used the quarterly monetary policy shock variables in
the maturity models.14 The impulse responses of the short and long-term rates to the expansionary
twist shock indicate that it increases short-term rates but decreases long-term rates. In addition, it
increases the current account balances while the steepening curve shock has little effect on them.
This result implies that the expansionary twist shock induces a change in the BOJ’s balance sheet
by purchasing long-term bonds more aggressively. Interestingly, it increases the stock prices and
the U.S. dollar-yen exchange rates. Furthermore, the impulse response of the inflation rate to the
expansionary twist shock indicates its positive effects.
We are now interested in the coefficients of the target interest rate shock, steepening curve
shock, and expansionary twist shock. Our estimates reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 6
address the responses to monetary policy shocks using three components. The results in column
(1) indicate that a target interest rate shock and an expansionary twist shock tend to increase the
loan spread, but a steepening curve shock significantly decreases the loan spread. The differences
in these responses coincide with the direction of loadings on the changes in interest rates in short
horizons, that is, positive target interest rate shock and expansionary twist shock are associated
with an increase in the short-term interest rates while a positive steepening curve shock is associ-
ated with a decrease in the short-term interest rate. Results in column (2), conditional on rating
information, demonstrate that the coefficients of three monetary policy shocks are not significant.
Hence, we found weak evidence for the expected market interest channel of monetary policy ef-
fects on the loan spreads.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 demonstrate the monetary policy shock effects on loan matu-
14The monetary policy shock variables are not correlated with macroeconomic control variables.
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rity. A target interest rate shock and an expansionary twist shock significantly induce borrowers
to prefer short-term borrowing. On the contrary, a steepening curve shock tends to make borrower
prefer long-term borrowing. These results hold both in columns (1) conditional on rating informa-
tion and (2) conditional on the borrower’s financial indicators, indicating that we find significant
responses of borrowers to the monetary policy shocks in their loan maturity choices through the
expected market interest rate channel.
Although the sign of coefficients on the target interest rate shock and the expansionary twist
shock are both negative, we considered the different impact of each monetary policy shock behind
this response. The target interest rate shock captures a parallel shift (up) of the yield curve, which
implies an increase in the cost of borrowing on all maturities. In this situation, borrowers can
presume upward pressure on borrowing costs related to the premiums on loans and prefer short-
term borrowing. As explained earlier, an expansionary twist shock is associated with a decrease in
long-term interest rates. Graham & Harvey (2001) demonstrate that corporate executives attempt
to time their interest rates and borrow short-term debt when they expect long-term rates to decline.
Assuming this also holds in Japan, the expectation induced by an expansionary twist shock that the
long-term rate would decline induces the borrower to prefer short-term debt to time the market.
[Tables 6 and 7 around here]
5.2 The differential effects of monetary policy shocks
So far, we obtained our results assuming that the responses of borrowers to monetary policy
shocks are uniform, but each borrower’s creditworthiness and financial constraints might differ,
leading to different debt finance policies for borrowers. The unconventional monetary policy,
including those in the United States and Europe, lowered the entire yield curve in all debt markets.
As a consequence of the (ultra-) loose monetary policy in many places, a lower fund-raising cost
offers borrowers more options for their debt choices, such as jumbo loans, ultra-long-term hybrid
loans, and perpetual subordinated bonds; otherwise, the fund-raising costs for these debt types
would be too high. Moreover, using U.S. data, Becker & Ivashina (2014) demonstrate that the
firms that cannot access the public bond market are most likely to be affected by bank-credit
supply. Given the varying accessibility to debt markets, we compared the results for firms who
have access to the bond market with firms without access to the bond market.
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From the descriptive statistics in Table 1, about 30% of the observed 28,586 tranches in the
Thomson Reuter LPC DealScan are issued by borrowers who have rating information available,
and 40% of the observations are issued by borrowers whose financial indicators are publicly avail-
able. Thus, borrowers have quite different sensitivities to the monetary policy shocks stemming
from different financial constraints. One reason for this is that no credit rating implies a reduced
availability of public information, which could signal the root of risk for investors. These bor-
rowers seem riskier or entail closer monitoring for creditors compared to those with public rating
information. Another reason is that the absence of a high-yield bonds market, which can be found
in the United States, allows for only corporate bonds rated above an investment grade, that is,
above BBB-rated, to be issued in the Japanese straight corporate bonds market. Therefore, bor-
rowers with the BBB rating or higher can access the corporate bond market, while the rest of the
borrowers have no access. One might believe that banks are the major players in Japanese cor-
porate finance, and so accessibility to bond markets is not important given the critical presence of
banks in corporate finance. However, more firms with access to the public bond market are becom-
ing global companies, with more than half of their net sales generated from international business.
This implies that firms that tap into the offshore market are the least financially constrained and
that the domestic bank credit conditions do not affect their debt financing as crucially as it does
those who cannot access the public bond market. For instance, after the recent turbulent conditions
brought about by the BOJ’s unconventional monetary policy in the bond market, the issue amounts
of corporate bonds increased substantially in 2016 owing to low bond yields. However, borrowers
below the BB rating or with no public rating could not access the bond market with these record
low yields. Although the substitution between bank loans and public corporate bonds is not the
focus of this study,15 we expect the borrowers with access and without access to bonds to face
different financial constraints.
This subsection explores whether the responses to monetary policy shocks are uniform for
borrowers by dividing our sample into two groups: borrowers with access and those without access
to the public corporate bond market. We expect the borrowers with access to bond markets to be
more sensitive to monetary policy shocks in order to time their borrowing because they are less
financially constrained and have more financing options. The empirical literature, for example,
15We would have to restrict the borrowers who have access to the bond market by eliminating about two-thirds of
observations in order to analyze the substitution between bank loans and public corporate bonds, and so we would
have to incorporate this topic into a separate paper about corporate debt choice.
22
Faulkender (2005) and Graham & Harvey (2001) among others, suggests that CFOs try to time
the market, that is, to time the interest rates. Graham & Harvey (2001) state that it is important in
particular for large firms, which are more likely to have a sophisticated treasury department, to time
the market interest rates. Thus, we expect borrowers with access to bonds to be more sensitive to
monetary policy shocks, assuming that they are relatively larger firms with more financing options,
and then the maturity for borrowers with access to bonds is more likely to be affected by monetary
policy shocks to time the market interests.
Columns (3)–(5) of Table 6 provide the estimates on the loan spread factors for borrower groups
with access and without access to bonds, respectively. Most of the borrowers without access to
bonds do not have publicly available information about their financial health. This means that
these borrowers are more likely to depend on the internal risk assessments that the banks assign
to these borrowers, and hence, the loan spread factors for these are different from those who have
access to bonds. However, the estimated coefficients on monetary policy shocks for both groups
are insignificant, and there is little to support the idea that the responses to monetary policy shocks
differ between these two groups.
The results in columns (3)–(4) of Table 7 relate to the borrowers with access to bonds who are
assumed to face fewer financial constraints than those without access to bonds. Less financially
constrained borrowers are considered to face fewer liquidity risks and choose a debt maturity to
time the market, believing that their prediction about the interest rate movements can lower their
fund-raising costs. Consistent with our assumption, the response to the expansionary twist shock
of borrowers with access to bonds is statistically significant at the 1% level for each specification
in columns (3) and (4). On the other hand, the responses of borrowers with no access to bonds
illustrated in columns (5) and (6) are not statistically significant. An expansionary twist shock is
associated with a decrease in long-term interest rates, and the negative estimated coefficients of
this variable suggest that borrowers with access to bonds are more likely to time the market by bor-
rowing short-term when they expect the long-term rates to decline. We find statistically significant
evidence of monetary policy effects on the financial policies of firms through the expected market
interest rate channel, and the effects differ across borrowers with different financial constraints.
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6 Conclusion
This study investigated the effects of monetary policy on the financing policies of firms through
the expected market interest rate channel at the firm level, using Japanese syndicated loan contracts
from 2000 to 2016, when the monetary policy was almost stuck at the zero bound in Japan and the
BOJ introduced many unconventional monetary policy measures such as forward rate guidance,
asset purchase programs, and QQE programs. By identifying the unconventional monetary policy
shocks from the reaction of the asset prices, we attempt to measure the monetary policy shocks
in the absence of a single measure of (unconventional) monetary policy stance during the sample
period. Since the Japanese syndicated loan market is almost dominated by banks, as illustrated in
Section 2, it might appear natural for bank loans to be affected by the monetary policy, given its
transmission mechanism. Nevertheless, the monetary policy effects seem to be unclear. On the
borrower’s side, several Japanese firms are reported to be cash-rich, and the firms still accumulate
cash after the global financial crisis. For our purpose, we control for both observed and unobserved
firm heterogeneity and unobserved time-varying bank heterogeneity in loan contracts.
We found that an expansionary twist shock, associated with a decrease in long-term interest
rates, exerts influence particularly on the non-pricing term (maturity) of loan contracts. We further
examined the effects of monetary policy shocks from the borrower’s financial constraints per-
spective. We found a significant response to monetary policy shocks associated with a decrease
in long-term interest rates only for the borrower group with access to bonds. This implies that
firms with access to bonds attempt to time the market in the belief that their prediction of interest
rate movements can lower their fundraising costs. This is consistent with evidence from previous
studies in the United States based on a survey of financial executives. However, the response of
borrowers who do not have access to the bond market is not significant, implying the loan contracts
of these borrowers seem more likely to depend on the internal risk assessment that banks assign. In
sum, monetary policy affects the maturity of loans, in particular for the less financially constrained
borrowers, through the expected market interest rate channel.
While the conventional means of stimulating the aggregate demand is no longer feasible when
the monetary policy is stuck at zero, the central banks of many countries introduced a variety of
communications to inform the public about their policy. Evidence presented in this study indicates
that their communication strategy could affect the investment financing policies of firms. Their
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communication designed to help shape the public expectations of future policy was found to have
played an important role in the borrowing decisions of firms. Moreover, when the central banks
of several countries are about to exit from their unconventional monetary policy measures, our
estimation results imply that the BOJ’s communication strategy to provide clear information about
the likely direction of future policies would become even more important in the financing policies
of firms, even though they may be very challenging.
Natural extensions of our study include the effects of monetary policy on the composition of
debt, as a ratio of bank loans and corporate bonds. We reviewed bank loans, but the firm decides its
financing policies for the optimal debt structure. For borrowers having access to bonds, they choose
the debt structure simultaneously. When the costs of bank loans and bonds issued are affected by
monetary policy, the debt structure of firms also changes. In addition, the effect of monetary policy
on the relation between the composition of debt and firm investment is an interesting area of work
for the future. The borrowing and investment choices of firms require different datasets, and this
topic remains for future research.
Appendix A. The Endogeneity of Main Bank Outcomes
Given the strong bank-firm relationship in Japan, one might be concerned about the certification
effect of main bank arrangers when the loan is arranged by the borrower’s main bank. That is, if
the main bank certification effect exists, the spread for a loan arranged by the borrower’s main
bank is lower, holding other factors that could affect the spread constant, due to the bank’s superior
access to private inside information on the borrower based on their long-term relationship and more
efficient monitoring.
To investigate the robustness of our results, we test whetherMain Bank Arranger is determined
endogenously. That is, unobserved factors, such as certain characteristics of a borrower, are sus-
pected to affect both the probability of choosing the main bank as a lead arranger and spread levels.
The approach to the test is that both the predicted probabilities from a probit model forMain Bank
Arranger which is a 0-1 dummy variable taking the value of unity when the borrower’s main bank
is a lead arranger and zero otherwise, and Spread are estimated by a maximum likelihood estima-
tor. We identify the main bank, which is listed first, from among the firm’s reference banks in the
latest issue of Japan company handbook (quarterly) immediately before each loan origination.
For the model to explain the choice of Main Bank Arranger, we use the HHI for the lead ar-
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ranger market and the indicator for whether a borrower is a listed company as explanatory variables
in a probit model. We test another specification using the HHI and the rating information as ex-
planatory variables in a probit model. The key results are that the estimated correlation between the
errors from these equations is -0.15, which is not significantly different from 0 (p-value is 0.16).
That is, the endogeneity ofMain Bank Arranger can be ruled out as contributing to our results.
Appendix B. The Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks on Economy
In this appendix, we demonstrate the effects of three monetary policy shocks on the economy
using the SVAR model in order to obtain a deeper understanding of the estimation result for the
maturity and spread model discussed in Section 5. We follow the strand of literature that exploits
the instrumental variable approach and combines a shock from micro-data with a VAR model to
identify the effect of a shock on the economy (see for example Stock & Watson (2012)). More
concretely, we assume that the dynamics of financial and macroeconomic variables, which are
denoted by n× 1 vector Yt, is approximated by a VAR system with p number of lags as follows:
Yt =
P∑
p=1
βpYt−p + νt, (6)
where νt denotes reduced form shocks of the VAR system. We assume that νt is represented by
a linear combination of some fundamental shocks, µt: I.e. we assume that νt = Bµt holds with
n×nmatrix B. Without loss of generality, we assume that the three monetary policy surprises are
defined as the first three elements of vector µt. Moreover, we define Σµ as a variance-covariance
matrix of the fundamental shocks µt as follows,
E(µtµ
′
t) = Σµ = D (7)
where D is a n× n diagonal matrix.
Using the identified three column vectors bi (i=1,2,3) in matrixB, we can calculate the impulse
response functions (IRFs), IRFhi, to monetary policy shock i in time horizon h as follows,
IRFhi = ψhbi (8)
where ψh denotes the impulse response function to non-orthogonalized shocks for horizon h in
reduced form of the VAR model.
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As endogenous variables in the SVAR, we include the eight financial market variables, two
macroeconomic variables, and the current account balances (CABs). The eight financial variables
consist of the monthly change rates of yen-U.S. dollar exchange rate, the NIKKEI225 stock index,
and the monthly changes of the three-month TIBOR future, and one-year, two-year, five-year, ten-
year, and 30-year swap rates. The monthly growth rate of the aggregate current account balances
of banks is included in order to capture the unconventional monetary policy where the BOJ ex-
pands its balance sheet. The two macroeconomic variables include the monthly growth rate of the
consumption price index (CPI; less foods and energy, adjusted for the consumption tax increases)
and Indices of Industrial Production (IIP). Both are seasonally adjusted before the calculation of
the growth rate. All the variables are illustrated as a percentage base. The length of the lag in the
SVAR model is chosen as one based on the AIC. Our monthly dataset is from January 2000 until
December 2016.
To estimate the VAR model, we used the bootstrap method by resampling 3,000 times. Figure
B1 illustrates the IRFs to a positive target interest rate shock of one standard deviation, indicating
that a positive shock shifts the entire yields curve upwards. Furthermore, it decreases the current
account balance although it increases slightly for the first few months. The CPI inflation rate and
the IIP decrease although they are not statistically significant. The result implies that the target
interest rate shock captures the conventional monetary policy shock, which affects the economy
through the level of interest rates in all maturities.
Figure B2 illustrates that a positive steepening curve shock decreases short-term rates and in-
creases long-term rates. However, it does not significantly change the CAB although the CAB
gradually increases after the shock hits the economy. Furthermore, the CPI inflation rate decreases
while the IIP increases. In this paper, the real effects of unconventional monetary policy are not
our focus. The growing literature suggests the definition of unconventional monetary policy shocks
and a method of identifying them (see, for example, Swanson (2015) and Nakashima et al. (2018)).
However, there is still no consensus for the definition and methodology. Hence, here we only pro-
vide some possible hypotheses. One explanation is that in a low interest environment, a tiny de-
crease in short-term rates without changing the central bank’s balance sheet is not so effective that
the inflation expectation does not change, although it stimulates production temporarily. Instead,
because the central bank has private information that other agents do not, it signals the informa-
tion to the other agents that the inflation would be lower than previously expected through the
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implementation of the monetary policy.16
Finally, Figure B3 illustrates that a positive expansionary twist shock increases short-term rates
while it decreases long-term rates. In addition, it increases the CAB substantially by stimulating the
inflation rate and production. In others words, the estimation results imply that the expansionary
twist shock stimulates the economy by purchasing long-term bonds and expanding its balance
sheet. Given this backdrop, we can reinterpret the results for the impact of the expansionary twist
shock on the loan maturity in Section 5; the expansionary twist shock increases output, thereby
reducing the incentive of firms to raise funds for precautionary motives.
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Figure 1: Trends of syndicated loans in Japan
Notes: This figure shows the number of annual syndicated loan deals and annual proceeds (JPY
in trillion) of total new loans for fixed investment, and the syndicated loans issued in Japan from
2000 through 2016. The number of deals is shown as a solid line, and the proceeds are shown as
bars.
Sources: Thomson Reuters and BOJ.
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Figure 2: Concentration measures for lead arranger in Japanese syndicated loans
Note: This figure shows the annual four-firm concentration ratio (CR4) and the annual HHI of the
Japanese syndicated loan lead arrangers from 2000 through 2016. Source: Own calculation using
data from the Thomson One database.
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Figure 4: Development of monetary policy shocks
Note: Each monetary policy shock is extracted as a common component using 11 financial market
variables through the principal component analysis, as described in the text.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Obs. 25% Median Mean 75% Std Dev
Maturity (months) 11,411 12 36 41.7 60 50.4
No of Lenders 11,411 2 4 4.8 6 3.8
Subordinated (dummy) 11,411 0 0 0 0 0.03
Volatility (30days) 11,411 22.5 31.7 35.8 44.4 20.5
ROE (%) 11,411 1.6 4 5.5 7.5 165.6
Long term debt to equity 11,411 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1
Total debt to EBITDA 11,411 2.2 4.5 6.9 8.9 18.7
Sales growth (%) 11,411 -3 3 6.5 9.9 36
EBITDA growth (%) 11,411 -9.8 6.4 32.9 25.8 286.2
Total assets (JPY millions) 11,411 50,977 177,277 898,613 762,117 2,074,571
Rating (dummies)
AAA 7,837 0 0 0.019 0 0.14
AA 7,837 0 0 0.12 0 0.34
A 7,837 0 0 0.42 1 0.49
BBB 7,837 0 0 0.37 1 0.48
BB 7,837 0 0 0.06 0 0.23
B 7,837 0 0 0.009 0 0.09
Spread (basis points) 580 46 70 82.31 100 57.05
Tenor (years) 580 1 3 3.48 5 4.12
Rating (dummies)
AAA 543 0 0 0.004 0 0.06
AA 543 0 0 0.13 0 0.33
A 543 0 1 0.58 1 0.49
BBB 543 0 0 0.21 0 0.40
BB 543 0 0 0.08 0 0.28
B 543 0 0 0.004 0 0.06
Notes: The full sample is from January 1, 2000, to December 31, 2016. Owing to data restric-
tions as discussed in Section 3, a smaller sample is used to analyze loan spreads. Thus, for
Spread, Tenor, and Rating dummies, descriptive statistics is calculated using a smaller sample.
Rating dummy is a 0–1 dummy variable taking the value of unity when the issuing firm has a
rating from AAA to B, and zero otherwise. Spread is measured in basis points over TIBOR.
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Table 2: Determinants of loan spreads
(Dependent Variable: Loan spread)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio
AA rating -60.09 1.61 -101.42 4.16∗∗∗
A rating -96.78 6.96∗∗∗ -102.29 5.46∗∗∗
BBB rating -69.39 5.50∗∗∗ -77.05 4.17∗∗∗
BB rating -27.06 1.43 -30.51 1.48
Volatility 0.55 1.42 0.81 2.00∗∗
ROE 0.14 0.17 1.42 1.84∗
Long term debt to equity -14.62 0.24 -28.03 0.51
Total debt to EBITDA -0.09 0.68 -0.11 0.80
Sales growth -0.05 0.70 -0.04 0.68
EBITDA growth 0.01 1.29 0.01 0.23
ln(Total assets) -12.71 1.60 -19.23 2.30∗∗
Tenor 4.82 10.53∗∗∗ 4.54 9.18∗∗∗ 5.54 12.30∗∗∗ 5.27 8.49∗∗∗
Secured -2.26 0.26 -10.25 1.41 -0.63 0.10 -7.59 1.39
No. of Lenders 0.08 0.21 0.19 0.41 0.27 0.62 0.40 0.71
Tranche type YES YES YES YES
Lender countries YES YES YES YES
Borrower FE YES YES YES YES
Industry-year FE YES YES
Observations 543 580 438 412
R-squared 0.67 0.50 0.49 0.29
Notes: This table reports results with borrower fixed effects and two-digit NAICS industry-by-year
fixed effects for loan spread. The dependent variable is Spread over TIBOR (in basis points). The
estimated equations (1) and (2) also include a set of annual dummy variables. We drop singleton
groups from the regression sample. t-ratios are the absolute values of t-statistics computed using
robust standard errors. R-squared reports the within R-squared. *, **, *** denote significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Estimates in this table use data from January 1, 2000, to
December 31, 2016.
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Table 3: Determinants of loan maturity
(Dependent Variable: Loan maturity in months)
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio
AAA rating 17.21 1.67∗ 14.38 1.22
AA rating 3.07 0.38 1.46 0.15
A rating 5.96 1.16 4.20 0.75
BBB rating 6.57 1.48 4.60 0.94
BB rating -4.36 1.16 -4.18 0.98
Volatility -0.04 2.09∗∗ -0.05 0.97
ROE 0.001 0.85 -0.002 0.33
Long term debt to equity -4.95 0.55 -7.59 0.41
Total debt to EBITDA 0.02 0.68 0.03 0.61
Sales growth 0.02 2.11∗∗ 0.004 0.25
EBITDA growth -0.003 2.78∗∗∗ -0.004 1.78∗
ln(Total assets) 1.72 0.94 -1.33 0.28
No. of Lenders -0.46 2.57∗∗∗ -0.59 3.47∗∗∗ -0.58 2.78∗∗∗
Subordinated 327.92 3.63∗∗∗ 420.33 4.17∗∗∗ 472.23 5.05∗∗∗
Tranche type YES YES YES
Lender countries YES YES YES
Borrower FE YES YES YES
Industry-year FE YES YES YES
Observations 7,837 11,411 6,427
R-squared 0.20 0.23 0.23
Notes: This table reports results with borrower fixed effects and two-digit NAICS industry-by-year
fixed effects for loan maturity. The dependent variable isMaturity in months. We drop singleton
groups from the regression sample. t-ratios are the absolute values of t-statistics computed using
robust standard errors. R-squared reports the within R-squared. *, **, *** denote significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Estimates in this table use data from January 1, 2000, to
December 31, 2016.
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Table 4: Credit supply conditions and loan spread
(Dependent Variable: Loan spread)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio
Economic expansion -150.87 1.36 38.17 0.17 -137.48 1.58 66.03 0.18
Lending attitude -1.62 1.83∗ -2.79 2.14∗∗ -1.61 1.86∗ -3.24 1.72∗
AA rating -44.28 1.20 -86.93 3.09∗∗∗
A rating -86.46 6.40∗∗∗ -95.63 4.52∗∗∗
BBB rating -56.26 3.93∗∗∗ -66.16 2.90∗∗∗
BB rating -18.81 0.97 -31.76 1.35
Volatility 0.47 1.28 1.16 1.84∗
ROE 0.11 0.13 5.45 1.34
Long term debt to equity -17.50 0.29 -13.55 0.24
Total debt to EBITDA -0.07 0.50 0.38 1.44
Sales growth -0.07 0.85 0.04 0.20
EBITDA growth 0.01 1.46 -0.35 1.07
ln(Total assets) -13.47 1.73∗ -54.27 2.49∗∗
Tenor 4.85 10.69∗∗∗ 4.57 9.63∗∗∗ 4.70 9.99∗∗∗ 5.00 7.34∗∗∗
Secured -1.81 0.21 -8.88 1.16 -2.74 0.54 -8.85 1.33
Borrower FE YES YES YES YES
Industry-year FE YES YES
Bank-year FE YES YES
Observations 543 580 391 365
R-squared 0.68 0.51 0.40 0.23
Notes: This table reports regression results obtained with macroeconomic control variables and bank-by-year
fixed effects in addition to borrower fixed effects and two-digit NAICS industry-by-year fixed effects. The
dependent variable is Spread over TIBOR in basis points. Economic expansion is the growth rate of the
Coincident index (CI), which is an index of Business Conditions published monthly by the Cabinet Office,
government of Japan. Lending attitude is a statistical survey response about Lending Attitude of Financial
Institutions in Tankan (Short-term Economic Survey of Enterprises in Japan) conducted quarterly by the
BOJ. Responses are aggregated into Diffusion Index by subtracting the percentage share of enterprises
responding (3) Severe from that of (1) Accommodative. Estimates use the value for small enterprises. The
estimated equations also include lender country dummies and tranche-type dummies. t-ratios are the absolute
values of t-statistics computed using robust standard errors. R-squared reports the within R-squared. *, **,
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Estimates in this table use data from
January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2016.
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Table 5: Credit supply conditions and loan maturity
(Dependent Variable: Loan maturity in months)
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio
Economic expansion 61.71 2.20∗∗ 31.64 1.71∗ 50.61 1.73∗
Lending attitude -0.42 1.45 -0.24 1.27 -0.55 1.80∗
Economic expansion×
0.11 2.10∗∗ 0.47 0.55 0.20 0.55
Total Debt to EBITDA
AAA rating 12.17 1.07 10.91 0.93
AA rating -0.11 0.01 1.03 0.11
A rating 4.45 0.77 3.47 0.57
BBB rating 3.92 0.78 3.23 0.60
BB rating -3.66 0.82 -3.61 0.77
Volatility -0.05 2.41∗∗ -0.07 1.35
ROE 0.001 1.17 -0.001 0.16
Long term debt to equity -2.85 0.29 -9.96 0.49
Total debt to EBITDA 0.01 0.51 -0.001 0.29
Sales growth 0.02 2.10∗∗ 0.02 1.14
EBITDA growth -0.003 2.81∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.87
No. of Lenders -0.52 2.66∗∗∗ -0.60 3.60∗∗∗ -0.55 2.73∗∗∗
Subordinated 439.51 4.06∗∗∗ 381.13 3.41∗∗∗ 439.70 4.05∗∗∗
Borrower FE YES YES YES
Industry-year FE YES YES YES
Bank-year FE YES YES YES
Observations 6,615 11,198 6,305
R-squared 0.20 0.21 0.20
Notes: This table reports regression results obtained with macroeconomic control variables and
bank-by-year fixed effects in addition to borrower fixed effects and two-digit NAICS industry-by-
year fixed effects. The definition of macroeconomic control variables are in Table 4. The dependent
variable isMaturity in months. The estimated equations also include lender country dummies and
tranche-type dummies. t-ratios are the absolute values of t-statistics computed using robust standard
errors. R-squared reports the within R-squared. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively. Estimates in this table use data from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2016.
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Table 6: Monetary policy shocks and loan spread
(Dependent Variable: Loan spread)
All observations With access to bonds
Without access
to bonds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Target interest rate shock 4.09 1.01 -1.78 0.69 6.66
(1.95)∗ (0.68) (0.76) (0.44) (0.43)
Steepening curve shock -6.72 -0.44 -0.78 -1.24 -7.75
(2.52)∗∗ (0.38) (0.39) (1.09) (0.87)
Expansionary twist shock 10.21 -0.66 -0.49 -0.91 34.14
(2.38)∗∗ (0.37) (0.16) (0.48) (1.13)
Economic expansion 16.93 -137.08 -67.75 -137.87 922.73
(0.05) (1.43) (0.44) (1.55) (0.73)
Lending attitude -2.36 -1.43 -1.53 -1.43 -8.26
(1.24) (1.66)∗ (0.89) (1.67)∗ (0.93)
AA rating -66.28 -22.76
(3.00)∗∗∗ (1.48)
A rating -67.92 -24.17
(4.52)∗∗∗ (3.04)∗∗∗
BBB rating -45.43
(3.04)∗∗∗
Volatility 1.38 0.36
(1.55) (1.24)
ROE 15.51 6.81
(2.68)∗∗∗ (2.01)∗∗
Long term debt to equity -0.47 -0.55
(1.48) (2.41)∗∗
Total debt to EBITDA 0.89 0.32
(3.01)∗∗∗ (1.67)∗
Sales growth 0.41 -0.42
(1.23) (1.34)
EBITDA growth -1.16 -0.27
(2.33)∗∗ (0.87)
ln(Total assets) -78.46 -3.69
(2.80)∗∗∗ (0.15)
Tenor 4.70 4.71 4.63 4.38 8.98
(6.82)∗∗∗ (9.63)∗∗∗ (7.70)∗∗∗ (9.37)∗∗∗ (5.39)∗∗∗
Continued
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Table 6: Continued
All observations With access to bonds
Without access
to bonds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Secured -9.28 -8.87 -13.37 -5.33 1.90
(0.82) (1.62) (2.51)∗∗ (0.99) (0.11)
Lender countries YES YES YES YES YES
Borrower FE YES YES YES YES YES
Industry-year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Bank-year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 327 353 231 321 220
R-squared 0.29 0.44 0.51 0.44 0.29
Notes: This table reports regression results obtained with the monetary policy shock variables and
explanatory variables in Table 4. Monetary policy shock variables are three principal components
along with the three largest eigenvalues from the changes in 11 financial asset variables, as shown in
Figure 3. The dependent variable is Spread over TIBOR in basis points. The estimated equations
also include a set of tranche-type dummies. Macroeconomic control variables are the same set as in
Table 4. A set of explanatory variables in (5) includes neither rating variables nor financial indicator
variables to maximize the sample size. t-ratios reported in parentheses are the absolute values of
t-statistics computed using robust standard. R-squared reports the within R-squared. *, **, ***
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Estimates in this table use data
from January 1, 2000, to December 31, 2016.
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Table 7: Monetary policy shocks and loan maturity
(Dependent Variable: Loan maturity in months)
All observations With access to bonds
Without access
to bonds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Target interest rate shock -1.15 -0.70 -0.90 -0.90 -3.13 0.04
(2.52)∗∗ (2.32)∗∗ (1.88)∗ (1.80)∗ (2.46)∗∗ (0.34)
Steepening curve shock 0.82 0.49 0.74 0.78 4.47 -0.20
(1.91)∗ (1.72)∗ (1.65)∗ (1.67)∗ (1.82)∗ (1.24)
Expansionary twist shock -1.23 -0.69 -1.23 -1.25 -3.35 0.20
(2.90)∗∗∗ (2.46)∗∗ (2.72)∗∗∗ (2.58)∗∗∗ (1.33) (0.98)
Economic expansion -6.16 -8.46 15.98 3.94 -201.08 -0.81
(0.17) (0.35) (0.44) (0.10) (1.39) (0.04)
Lending attitude 0.23 0.20 0.05 0.01 -2.08 -0.16
(0.66) (0.79) (0.15) (0.03) (0.63) (0.77)
Economic expansion× 0.12 0.49 0.12 0.33 3.65 1.28
Total Debt to EBITDA (2.23)∗∗ (0.55) (2.25)∗∗ (0.36) (0.46) (0.86)
AAA rating 14.82 6.63
(1.32) (0.66)
AA rating 1.27 -7.49
(0.14) (1.04)
A rating 5.59 -1.36
(0.97) (0.35)
BBB rating 4.92
(0.96)
BB rating -2.69 15.86
(0.59) (1.16)
Volatility -0.04 -0.02 -0.04
(1.93)∗ (0.37) (2.68)∗∗∗
ROE 0.001 -0.05 0.0003
(1.15) (0.84) (0.42)
Long term debt to equity -2.47 -11.58 1.68
(0.26) (0.52) (0.27)
Total debt to EBITDA 0.01 0.03 -0.02
(0.41) (0.55) (0.74)
Sales growth 0.02 0.02 0.01
(2.00)∗∗ (0.99) (0.86)
Continued
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Table 7: Continued
All observations With access to bonds
Without access
to bonds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EBITDA growth -0.003 -0.01 -0.002
(2.72)∗∗∗ (1.56) (1.84)∗
ln(Total assets) 2.23 -4.22 2.23
(1.09) (0.66) (1.39)
No. of lenders -0.52 -0.60 -0.59 -0.65 -0.54 -0.34
(2.64)∗∗∗ (3.58)∗∗∗ (2.61)∗∗∗ (2.79)∗∗∗ (1.12) (2.39)∗∗
Subordinated 440.34 381.58 411.80 411.12 na 237.25
(4.08)∗∗∗ (3.41)∗∗∗ (3.26)∗∗∗ (3.24)∗∗∗ (1.52)
Lender countries YES YES YES YES YES YES
Borrower FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry-year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Bank-year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 6,615 11,198 6,135 5,807 394 5,205
R-squared 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.37
This table reports regression results obtained with the monetary policy shock variables and
explanatory variables in Table 5. Monetary policy shock variables are three principal components
along with the three largest eigenvalues from the changes in 11 financial asset variables, as shown
in Figure 3. The dependent variable isMaturity in months. The estimated equations also include
tranche-type dummies. Macroeconomic control variables are the same set as in Table 4. t-ratios
are the absolute values of t-statistics computed using robust standard errors. R-squared reports the
within R-squared. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Estimates in this table use data from January 1, 2000, to December 31, 2016.
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Figure B1: IRFs to a Target Interest Rate Shock
Note: The solid line indicates the median of the estimated IRFs to a positive target interest rate
shock of one standard deviation based on the bootstrap method by resampling 3,000 times. The
shadow area indicates 90% confidence interval based on the bootstrap.
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Figure B2: IRFs to a Steepening Curve Shock
Note: The solid line indicates the median of the estimated IRFs to a positive steepening curve
shock of one standard deviation based on the bootstrap method by resampling 3,000 times. The
shadow area indicates 90% confidence interval based on the bootstrap.
46
5 10 15
-0.5
0
0.5
USD/JPY
5 10 15
-1
0
1
NIKKEI225
5 10 15
-1
0
1
CAB
5 10 15
-5
0
5 10
-3 TIBOR 3-month future
5 10 15
-0.01
0
0.01
SWAP1y
5 10 15
-0.01
0
0.01
SWAP 2y
5 10 15
-0.01
0
0.01
SWAP 5y
5 10 15
-0.01
0
0.01
SWAP 10y
5 10 15
-0.01
0
0.01
SWAP 30y
5 10 15
-0.01
0
0.01
CPI
5 10 15
-0.2
0
0.2
IIP
Figure B3: IRFs to an Expansionary Twist Shock
Note: The solid line indicates the median of the estimated IRFs to a positive expansionary twist
shock of one standard deviation based on the bootstrap method by resampling 3,000 times. The
shadow area indicates 90% confidence interval based on the bootstrap.
47
